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National Human Rights Institutions and their Sub-National 
Counterparts: The Question of Decentralisation 
 
Abstract: In this article I outline and explore the arguments in favor of and in opposition to the 
establishment of sub-national human rights institutions (such as state and local human rights 
commissions, ombudsmen and the like) in nations that already possess national human rights 
institutions. This analysis will be based on an application of prior research findings in the 
broader field of administrative decentralisation as tailored to the particularities of human rights 
implementation. Where relevant I also examine the implications of institutional type for 
decentralisation, as well as the implication of different attributes of the relevant jurisdiction. As a 
conclusion, I lay out the circumstances under which the establishment of sub-national human 
rights institutions will be more or less advantageous.  
Keywords: Decentralisation; federalism; subsidiarity; national human rights institutions; 
ombudsmen; human rights commissions 
 
I. Introduction 
For the past twenty-five years, one of the most important human rights questions facing 
countries around the world has been whether or not they should establish national human rights 
institutions (‘NHRIs’). By and large, this is no longer an issue: the question has been answered in 
the affirmative. With a handful of (significant) exceptions, NHRIs are now considered as 
standard features of the modern democratic state.
1
 As of August 2016, 117 NHRIs have been 
accredited by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (‘GANHRI’), of which 
75 were deemed fully compliant with the UN-issued Paris Principles, the authoritative set of 
standards for the operation of NHRIs.
2
  
Within these nations that now possess NHRIs, there has in many cases been an important 
follow-up question: should analogous human rights institutions also be established at sub-
national governmental levels? Many jurisdictions, especially in Europe and the Americas, in fact 
have established what I term sub-national human rights institutions (‘SNHRIs’), those human 
rights boards, human rights ombudsman, anti-discrimination commissions, and the like that can 
be defined as independent non-judicial governmental institutions that possess a sub-national 
mandate, and whose mission includes the implementation of human rights norms.
3
 In part, this 
reflects a strong global trend toward decentralisation of government services in recent decades.
4
 
                                                          
1
 Julie Mertus, Human Rights Matters: Local Politics and National Human Rights Institutions (Stanford U 
Press 2009) 4; Brice Dickson, ‘The Contribution of Human Rights Commissions to the Protection of 
Human Rights’ (2003) Pub L 272, 285 (‘a human rights commission is a sine qua non of a democratic 
society’). Major countries that still lack NHRIs include the USA, China, Japan, and Italy. 
2
 GANHRI, ICC Sub-Committee on Accreditation, 
<http://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/ICCAccreditation/Pages/default.aspx> (accessed 25 October 2016). 
3
 This definition is elaborated upon and justified elsewhere. See Andrew Wolman, ‘Sub-National Human 
Rights Institutions: A Definition and Typology’, forthcoming in (2017) Human Rights Review. 
4
 Andrés Rodríguez-Pose and Roberto Ezcurra, ‘Does decentralization matter for regional disparities? A 
cross-country analysis’ (2010) 10 J Econ Geog 619, 619-21 (‘Over the last 40 years a decentralizing wave 
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In Africa and Asia, SNHRIs remain exceptional, although they are rapidly proliferating in certain 
countries in those continents, as well.
5
  
To date, there has been very little scholarly analysis of this question. Certain European 
trans-national institutions have recommended the establishment of SNHRIs (or, specifically, 
local ombudsmen).
6
 A number of academics have made arguments that states should promote the 
implementation of human rights at the local government level,
7
 and a few others have studied 
specific instances of NHRI decentralisation.
8
 However, there has been little informed debate 
regarding the implications of NHRI decentralisation, and its advantages or disadvantages. This 
article will make a first step towards filling the gap in the literature.  
 Specifically, in this article I will outline and elaborate upon the arguments in favor of and 
in opposition to the establishment of SNHRIs in nations that already possess NHRIs and, based 
on these arguments, very briefly lay out the circumstances under which the establishment of 
SNHRIs will be more likely to be appropriate.
9
 I will not attempt to provide a definitive answer 
to the general question of whether sub-national governments should establish SNHRIs (or the 
related questions of whether national governments should authorize or allow the establishment of 
SNHRIs). In this respect, I am in accord with Nicolaidis that ‘only on an ad hoc basis is it 
possible to know whether a particular topic or area in a given time and place is more properly 
regulated at one level of governance’. 10  However, the arguments for and against SNHRI 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
has swept the world’); Janne Nijmann, ‘Renaissance of the City as Global Actor’ ASSER Research Paper 
2016-02 (February 2016), 15 (‘Decentralisation – the transfer of authority and responsibility from a 
higher (more central) to a lower level of government – is a world-wide trend since the 1980s.’) 
5
 In Korea, for example, twenty jurisdictions have established SNHRIs since 2012. Korea Human Rights 
Foundation, Report on Local Government and Human Rights (Gwangju Dev Inst 2014) 218-19. 
6
 See, eg, Council of Europe Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, Recommendation 61 (1999) 
‘On the Role of Local and Regional Mediators/ Ombudsmen in Defending Citizen’s Rights’, art 22; 
Council of Europe Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, Resolution 191 (2004) ‘On Regional 
Ombudspersons: An Institution in the Service of Citizens’ Rights’, art 16. The Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe has asserted that regional and local ombudsmen should be established ‘as 
appropriate’. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Recommendation 1615/2003. 
7
 See, e.g., Antoine Meyer, ‘Local Governments & Human Rights Implementation: Taking Stock and a 
Closer Strategic Look’ (2009) 3 Pace Diritti Humani 7; Michele Grigolo, ‘Incorporating Cities into the 
EU Anti-Discrimination Policy: Between Race Discrimination and Migrant Rights’ (2011) 34(10) Ethnic 
& Rac Stud 1751; Conrad Bosire, ‘Local Government and Human Rights: Building Institutional Links for 
the Effective Protection and Realisation of Human Rights in Africa’ (2011) 11 Afr Hum Rts L J 147. 
8
 See, eg, Teresa Rees and Paul Chaney, ‘Multilevel Governance, Equality and Human Rights: Evaluating 
the First Decade of Devolution in Wales’ (2011) 10(2) Soc Poly & Socy 219; Predrag Dimitrijević, ‘Do 
we need local ombudsmen?: Protector of Human Rights’ (2005) 3(1) Facta Universitatis: Law and 
Politics 25. 
9
 While this article will focus on situations where NHRIs already exist (which is the majority of countries), 
many of the arguments would also apply to decisions regarding whether or not to establish an SNHRI in 
jurisdictions that lack NHRIs. 
10
 Kalypso Nicolaidis, ‘Conclusion: The Federal Vision behind the Federal State’ in Kalypso Nicolaidis 
and Robert Howse (eds), The Federal Vision (OUP 2002) 446. See also Charles Hankla, ‘When is fiscal 
Decentralization Good for Governance?’ (2009) 39(4) Publius 632, 637 (‘If there is an overarching theme 
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establishment should help inform the decision-makers at any level that are struggling with this 
question. 
 The arguments in this article are explicitly built upon the existing research detailing the 
general implications of decentralising administrative functions, some of which dates back several 
decades.
11
 While the findings from this existing literature are the starting point for my arguments, 
however, they are not the end of the analysis. The application of findings from general 
decentralisation research to the question of SNHRIs requires further elaboration, both because 
human rights implementation differs in certain respects from ordinary service delivery, and 
because the implications of decentralisation of an independent government watchdog such as an 
SNHRI are difficult than those of an ordinary agency. I therefore supplement the decentralisation 
analysis with human rights-specific arguments, both conceptual and in some cases based on 
empirical observations of NHRI and SNHRI behavior. Where relevant I will also examine the 
implications of SNHRI type for decentralisation, as well as the implication of different attributes 
of the relevant jurisdiction. 
II. Conceptual Background 
 As a preliminary to my analysis, this section will introduce the relevant aspects of the 
most important concepts discussed in this article: namely, decentralisation, deconcentration, and 
subsidiarity, and discuss how they are relevant to the question of whether or not to establish an 
SNHRI in a country that already possesses an NHRI.   
A. Decentralisation 
The term ‘decentralisation’ has been defined in a number of different ways over the 
years.
12
 At its broadest, it has sometimes been defined to include the delegation of powers, 
divestment/privatization, deconcentration, and devolution to sub-national governments.
13
 This 
paper, however, will use the narrower definition proposed by (among others) the International 
Center of Human Rights Policy, namely that decentralisation is the ‘transfer of power and 
responsibility from national (or central) government to subsidiary levels, which may be regional, 
municipal or local’.14 Decentralisation does not necessarily imply federalism, which commonly 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
in the [decentralisation] literature, it is that the impact of strengthening subnational institutions, whether 
positive or negative, depends sensitively on case-specific details’). 
11
 See, eg, Charles Tiebout, ‘A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures’ (1956) 65 J Pol Econ 416; Richard 
Musgrave, ‘Theories of Fiscal Federalism’ (1969) 4(24) Pub Finances 521; Wallace Oates, Fiscal 
Federalism (Harcourt 1972). 
12
 For an overview of various definitions, see UNDP, Decentralization: A Sampling of Definitions (1999) 
<http://web.undp.org/evaluation/evaluations/documents/decentralization_working_report.PDF> (accessed 
23 October 23, 2016). 
13
 UNDP, Decentralized Governance Programme: Strengthening Capacity for People-Centered 
Development, Management Development and Governance Division, Bureau for Development Policy 
(1997) 5-6. 
14
 International Council on Human Rights Policy, ‘Local Rule: Decentralisation and Human Rights’ (2002) 
5. The term ‘decentralisation’ will be therefore used as functionally synonymous with the term 
‘devolution’. UNDP (n 13) 5-6 (‘The transfer of authorities to [autonomous lower-level] units is often 
referred to as devolution and is the most common understanding of genuine decentralization’). 
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refers to ‘a constitutionally guaranteed division of competences between territorially defined 
governmental levels’, although there is significant overlap in the research studying 
decentralisation and the research explicitly focused on federalism.
15
 Rather, decentralisation can 
occur in every nation that has sub-national administrative divisions, which is to say virtually 
every nation in the world.
16
 
In this context, the establishment of SNHRIs where there is already an existing NHRI can 
be seen as a form of decentralisation, as powers and responsibilities (for human rights 
implementation by an independent body) that once existed only at the national level will now 
exist at the sub-national level as well. It is important to emphasize that decentralisation and 
centralization are not incompatible concepts, in the sense that expanding powers at the sub-
national level necessarily implies a reduction or absence of powers at the national level.
17
 Indeed, 
for countries with NHRIs, it is very unlikely that those NHRIs will be fully replaced by SNHRIs, 
because engagement with the national government and with supra-national bodies are important 
tasks that at this point are clearly better undertaken by national bodies (and sub-national bodies 
are in fact actively prevented from full access to the international system by GANHRI rules).
18
 
Rather, it is more likely that the NHRI and SNHRI will share responsibilities for human rights 
promotion, monitoring and education in the sub-national jurisdiction, and possibly share 
jurisdiction for complaint-handling as well. In some cases, however, an SNHRI will be 
established in an autonomous region where the NHRI previously lacked jurisdiction, or an 
SNHRI will focus exclusively on handling complaints that the NHRI is not mandated to 
handle.
19
 This would correspond to a non-overlapping jurisdictional arrangement (often called 
dual federalism, in the context of federal states), but this type of arrangement is relatively rare, 
both for SNHRIs and for other types of government service providers.
20
 
Decentralisation can, in general, be categorized as either a top-down or a bottom-up 
phenomenon.
21
 Top-down decentralisation is initiated by the national government, and normally 
pursues national-level objectives, such as shifting fiscal constraints to a lower level or increasing 
national well-being. Bottom-up decentralisation is initiated by local actors, and pursues local 
                                                          
15
 Jan Biela et al, Policy-Making in Multi-Level Systems (ECPR Press 2013) 7.  
16
 Edward Rubin, ‘Puppy Federalism and the Blessings of America’ (2001) 574 Annals Am Acad Pol & 
Soc Sci 37, 39 (‘With the possible exception of some postage-stamp states … every nation is 
decentralized to some extent; they all have territorial subunits exercising some degree of governmental 
authority’). 
17
 UNDP (n 13) 1. 
18
 See, Andrew Wolman, ‘Welcoming a New International Human Rights Actor? The Participation of 
Subnational Human Rights Institutions at the United Nations’ (2014) 20 Global Governance 437, 440. 
19
 In Austria, for example, the Länder governments may choose to establish an ombudsman (as two have 
done) or alternatively to delegate the federal ombudsman the authority to address complaints about 
administration in that Länder (as seven have done). Linda Reif, The Ombudsman, Good Governance and 
the International Human Rights System (Martinus Nijhoff 2004) 150. 
20
 Andrew Wolman, ‘The Relationship Between National and Sub-National Human Rights Institutions in 
Federal States’ (2013) 17 Intl J Hum Rts 445, 447-48. 
21
 Bernard Dafflon and Thiery Madlès, ‘Decentralization: A Few Principles from the Theory of Fiscal 
Federalism’ (2011) Agence Française de Développement Notes and Documents No 42, 4-8. 
6 
 
objectives such as increasing local innovation or catering to local preferences in government 
service delivery. Each of these types of decentralisation can be seen with the establishment of 
SNHRIs. Top-down decentralisation can be seen in the establishment of SNHRIs by national 
governments in some post-conflict zones, such as Northern Ireland or Mindanao.
22
 The SNHRIs 
established in some so-called ‘human rights cities’, on the other hand, are typically bottom-up 
initiatives, as (in general) are the human rights and anti-discrimination commissions of the 
United States.
23
 Other SNHRIs require initiative from both above and below, as is the case in 
India and Russia, where SNHRIs were first authorized by a central government, but later 
established by sub-national entities.
24
 This paper is not tailored to address one or the other type 
of decentralisation. However, the strength of the various arguments outlined here will evidently 
vary according to whether one approaches the issue from a position of national or local power. 
B. Deconcentration 
 Deconcentration can be defined as ‘situations in which central government offices are 
moved to the regions but remain under the control of central government’.25 In theory, it may be 
feasible to delineate a bright line between deconcentration and decentralisation. In practice, 
however, the two lie on either ends of a spectrum between total national control of a local office 
and total absence of control. In some systems, actual practice lies somewhere in the middle; this 
is certainly the case with many SNHRIs. To give some examples, in Morocco, the Regional 
Human Rights Commissions operate independently in responding to complaints, but 
commissioners are appointed by the National Council for Human Rights, the regional 
commissions follow national policies for human rights promotion, and the National Council 
supervises the regional commissions’ development of human rights observatories.26 In India and 
Russia, the SNHRIs operate independently, but implement a mandate determined by national-
level legislation.
27
 In Mexico, the SNHRIs operate independently, but their rulings can be 
appealed to the Mexican National Human Rights Commission.
28
  
This paper does not address the question of whether (or when) NHRI deconcentration is 
beneficial. In fact, the international community has been quite clear in calling for 
                                                          
22
 Northern Ireland Act [UK] 1998, ch. 47; Republic Act 9054 [Philippines] (2001), sec 16. 
23
 See, generally, Charlotte Berends et al (eds), Human Rights Cities: Motivations, Mechanisms, 
Implications (University College Roosevelt 2013); Kenneth Saunders K and Hyo Eun Bang, ‘A Historical 
Perspective on US Human Rights Commissions’ (John F. Kennedy School of Government 2007).   
24
 Protection of Human Rights Act [India] 1993, as amended by the Protection of Human Rights 
(Amendment) Act 2006 – no. 43 of 2006, ch. V; Constitution of the Russian Federation (1993) art 72; 
Federal Constitutional Law [Russia] No. 1-FKZ of February 26, 1997. 
25
 International Council on Human Rights Policy (n 14) 6. 
26
 Conseil National des Droits de l’Homme, Présentation, Missions, et Mandat Territorial de Chaque 
Commission, <http://www.ccdh.org.ma/fr/commissions-regionales-des-droits-de-lhomme/presentation-
missions-et-mandat-territorial-de-chaque> (accessed 25 October 2016). 
27
 Protection of Human Rights Act [India] (n 24) ch. V; Constitution of the Russian Federation (n 24) art 
72; Federal Constitutional Law [Russia] (n 24). 
28
 Mónica Beltrán Gaos, La Comision Nacional de los Derechos Humanos de Mexico (Univ Politécnica 
de Valencia 2005) 249. 
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deconcentration of NHRIs where needed to ensure adequate public accessibility.
29
 Thus the Paris 
Principles mandate that NHRIs shall ‘set up local or regional sections’30 and the GANHRI Sub-
Committee on Accreditation has on many occasions suggested that NHRIs open up branch 
offices in order to comply with the Paris Principles’ mandate of accessibility. 31   Amnesty 
International has likewise recommended that ‘local and regional offices are vitally important to 
the effective functioning of NHRIs in a large country, or a country with isolated and inaccessible 
centres of population, or where transportation is difficult’.32 Many NHRIs currently have large 
numbers of branch offices, while others have none, especially in small countries.
33
 
C. Subsidiarity 
 The principle of subsidiarity also plays an important role in questions of decentralisation 
for many issue areas, including human rights.
34
 There is no universally accepted definition for 
the concept, and in fact it is a notoriously vague and multi-faceted term.
35
 In general, however, 
subsidiarity has been characterized as ‘a presumption for local-level decisionmaking, which 
allows for the centralization of powers only for particular, good reasons’.36 Beyond this broad 
definition, subsidiarity is sometimes divided up into weak or strong versions. Thus, according to 
Jachtenfuchs and Krisch, weak subsidiarity involves ‘an easily rebuttable presumption—a 
presumption for the local that provides a low threshold and can be overcome by any reason that 
makes action on a higher level appear advantageous, be it for the sake of efficiency, efficacy, or 
justice’, while a stronger version puts forth a higher threshold, namely ‘a presumption in favor of 
                                                          
29
 According to Carver, the most important element of NHRI accessibility is ‘having offices or other 
points of contact throughout the country, not only in the capital city.’ Richard Carver, ‘One NHRI or 
Many?: How Many Institutions does it Take to Protect Human Rights? Lessons from the European 
Experience’ (2011) 3(1) J Hum Rts Practice 116.  
30
 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 48/134, ‘Principles Relating to the Status of 
National Institutions’ (1993) sec 3(e). 
31
 See, eg, GANHRI, ‘GANHRI Sub-Committee on Accreditation Report – May 2016 (Geneva 2016) 13; 
17; 21; 23; 31; 36; 39; 46; 49 (‘where possible, accessibility should be further enhanced by establishing a 
permanent regional presence’). 
32
 Amnesty International, ‘National Human Rights Institutions – Amnesty International’s 
Recommendations for Effective Protection and Promotion of Human Rights’ (2001) IOR 40/007/2001, 
§9.1. 
33
 For example, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission has nine branch offices, Venezuela’s 
Defensoría del Pueblo has 33 branch offices, Nepal National Human Rights Commission has eight branch 
offices, and the South African Human Rights Commission has nine branch offices; one in each provincial 
capital. Wolman, ‘The Relationship Between National and Sub-National Human Rights Institutions’ (n 20) 
448-50. 
34
 See, generally, Paolo Carozza, ‘Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights 
Law’ (2003) 97 Am J Intl L 38. 
35
 Markus Jachtenfuchs and Nico Krisch, ‘Subsidiarity in Global Governance’ (2016) 79(2) Law & 
Contemp Prob 1, 5; Pierpaolo Donati, ‘What Does “Subsidiarity” Mean? The Relational Perspective’ 
(2009) 12 J Mkts & Morality 211, 211 (2009). 
36
 Jachtenfuchs and Krisch, ibid, 1. 
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local governance that can be rebutted only by strong reasons in exceptional cases’.37 At its 
strongest, subsidiarity has been said to signify that, in the words of Halberstam ‘the central 
government should play only a supporting role in governance, acting only if the constituent units 
of government are incapable of acting on their own’.38 
 The arguments presented in this paper are relevant to a subsidiarity analysis in two 
distinct ways. First, to the extent that one finds the arguments in favor of SNHRI establishment 
to be generally convincing, then these arguments provide a justification for asserting an 
accordingly strong form of subsidiarity for independent human rights institutions (and 
conversely, if they do not seem like strong arguments, then only a weak form would be justified). 
Second, to the extent that one finds the arguments against SNHRI establishment to be convincing 
in a given concrete situation, this can provide the basis for overcoming the presumption for local 
governance that lies at the heart of the subsidiarity principle. 
III. Arguments in Favor of SNHRI Establishment 
 In this section, I will outline five of the principal decentralisation arguments that can be 
used to justify the establishment of an SNHRI in a nation that already possesses an NHRI, 
namely arguments based on physical proximity, cultural proximity, autonomy, human rights 
innovation, and robustness. 
A. Physical proximity 
One obvious argument for the establishment of SNHRIs is that by being located in close 
proximity to the people that they serve, SNHRIs are able to implement human rights more 
effectively than centralized NHRIs. Physical proximity to the area being served has always been 
one of the primary arguments for decentralisation of government services.
39
 Physical proximity 
to local populations conveys informational advantages to local administrators and decision-
makers.
40
 It also allows for more rapid responses to changing local conditions, and cheaper 
access to local sites. This general argument has been embraced in the realm of human rights 
implementation by many practitioners and advocates. For example the Council of Europe 
Commissioner for Human Rights stressed the importance of doing human rights work ‘locally, 
close to the people’, because ‘geographical and personal proximity between inhabitants and local 
decision-makers … has obvious advantages’.41  
There are a number of component claims to the argument that human rights 
implementation is benefited by physical proximity between the service provider and recipient. 
One potential claim is that SNHRIS will be more knowledgeable about the local environment 
                                                          
37
 Ibid, 8. 
38
 Daniel Halberstam, ‘Federal Powers and the Principle of Subsidiarity’ in Vikram Amar and Mark 
Tushnet (eds), Global Perspectives on Constitutional Law (OUP 2009) 34. 
39
 See, generally, Jesse Newmark, ‘Legal Aid Affairs: Collaborating with Local Governments on the Side’ 
(2012) 21 Boston U Public Interest L J 195, 204. 
40
 Hayek, F.A., 1948. Individualism and Economic Order. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
41
 Thomas Hammarberg, Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Bringing Human Rights Home: Human 
Rights Action at the Local Level’, Statement before the Council of Europe Congress of Local and 
Regional Authorities, 22 March 2011, CE Doc CommDH/Speech(2011)3. 
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because they are physically based there.
42
 Another is that human rights monitoring is facilitated 
by a local presence, because human rights institutions can receive consistent feedback from the 
local population.
43
 A third is that local offices facilitate contact with grassroots NGOs, which in 
turn improves human rights implementation.
44
 A fourth is that victims of human rights violations 
will be better able to access justice through nearby complaint mechanisms.
45
 A final claim is that 
by having easier access to the local population, SNHRIs will find it easier to effectively engage 
in human rights promotion and training.
46
  
In my view, it would be difficult to rebut this argument. That is to say, while one may 
certainly argue against SNHRI establishment on other grounds (i.e., cost, independence, 
effectiveness, etc.), there is no credible argument that human rights are better protected through a 
lack of proximity to a particular population. The one caveat, though, is that physical proximity 
provides an equally valid argument for decentralisation and deconcentration. In those 
jurisdictions that already have NHRI branch offices, the physical proximity argument is no 
longer a good reason to support the establishment of an SNHRI rather than the support of an 
existing NHRI. 
B. Cultural proximity  
 Another argument in favor of decentralisation is that SNHRIs will have a closer socio-
cultural proximity to local populations in pluralistic societies, which will improve their ability to 
promote and protect human rights, in at least three separate ways. First, human rights workers 
who come from the same socio-cultural background of the communities they serve will likely be 
more knowledgeable about the human rights issues facing their community. This should lead to 
human rights implementation that is targeted to those in society most in need. 
 Second, local populations may be more likely to accept human rights norms as legitimate 
(and local governments more likely to concede to human rights demands) if those norms are 
coming from their co-ethnics and social peers, rather than being imposed in a quasi-imperialist 
                                                          
42
 Enric Bartlett, ‘National and/or Regional/Local Ombudsman’, paper presented at the Regional 
Ombudsman Conference: The Ombudsman in Southeastern Europe (Sofia, Bulgaria, November 28–30, 
2003). 
43
 Kim Joong-Seop, ‘Toward Human Rights in the Local Community: Multiple Approaches for 
Implementation’ (2010) 39(1) Dev & Soc 119, 127; Axel Marx et al, ‘Localizing Fundamental Human 
Rights in the European Union: What is the Role of Local and Regional Authorities, and How to 
Strengthen It?’ (2015) 7(2) J Hum Rts Practice 246, 267. 
44
 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Role of local government in the promotion and protection of human rights 
– Final report of the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee’ (7 August 2015), UN Doc 
A/HRC/30/49, para 55. 
45
 Thomas Hammarberg, ‘Recommendation on Systematic Work for Implementing Human Rights at the 
National Level’, CE Doc CommDH(2009)3 (2009) (‘[Regional ombudsmen’s] geographical proximity to 
people makes them more available and accessible to people whose rights have been violated’); Bartlett (n 
42); Marx et al (n 43) 266. 
46
 Doris Ansari and Hans Martin Tschudi, ‘Regional Ombudspersons: An Institution in the Service of 
Citizens’ Rights,’ Council of Europe Congress of Local and Regional Authorities Explanatory 
Memorandum CPR (11)  7 Part II.  
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manner from a distant capital (or New York or Geneva).
47
 This may be especially true of socio-
economic rights that involve income redistribution, given evidence that people are most willing 
to engage in acts of self-sacrifice with respect to people with whom they feel a cultural affinity.
48
 
A corollary of this argument is that local victims of human rights violations might feel more 
comfortable approaching SNHRIs when the victims speak the same language and share life 
experiences with the SNHRI officers.
49
 
 Third, with decentralisation, services and regulations can be tailored more efficiently and 
flexibly to community needs, rather than centrally administered in a ‘one size fits all’ fashion.50 
To the extent that accepted universal norms are being implemented in culturally specific ways so 
as to have a more beneficial impact on local populations, this would seem to be an unqualified 
advantage: human rights scholars generally agree that human rights may be legitimately 
implemented in different ways depending on local conditions, as long as the core content of 
those rights are respected.
51
  The risk, however, it that by implementing human rights in a 
manner acceptable to the majority in a sub-national jurisdiction, an SNHRI might end up 
alienating or even oppressing a group that is in the minority; for this reason, tailoring human 
rights implementation to local needs is perhaps most effective in local jurisdictions that are not 
themselves heterogeneous (within countries that are heterogeneous).
52
 
More controversially, SNHRIs that share a socio-cultural proximity to the people that 
they serve would seem to be better placed (relative to NHRIs) to engage in the normative 
development implicit in the localization of human rights norms, defined as the ‘active 
construction of [new norms] through discourse, framing, grafting, and cultural selection of 
foreign ideas by local actors, which results in the former developing significant congruence with 
local beliefs and practices’.53 As stated more concisely, local human rights implementation by 
                                                          
47
 Barbara Oomen, ‘Rights and the City: Does the Localization of Human Rights Contribute to Equality?’ 
in Marjolein van den Brink et al (eds), Equality and human rights: nothing but trouble?, Liber amicorum 
Titia Loenen, SIM Special no 38, SIM (2015) 407. 
48
 Leslie Wexler, ‘The Promise and Limits of Local Human Rights Internationalism’ (2010) 37 Fordham 
Urban L J 599, 625-26. 
49
 Derrick McKoy and Yvonne Stone, ‘The Ombudsman and Effective Local Public Administration: A 
Case Study’, Report of the Meeting of the OAS Program of Cooperation in Decentralization, Local 
Government and Citizen Participation (Kingson, Jamaica 1998) (‘The greatest advantage to be derived 
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SNHRIs ‘gives meaning to human rights’.54 Some scholars argue that by drawing upon local 
traditions, localization will enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of the universal human 
rights regime.
55
 Of course, the idea of localization is controversial; some see pluralism as 
dangerous to the human rights project.
56
 This objection will be discussed in more depth below, in 
the section on human rights fragmentation.  
To a certain extent, socio-cultural proximity between an NHRI and local populations can 
be arranged through deconcentration as well as decentralisation, for example where local offices 
are staffed with local hires. However, deconcentration will almost necessarily be less effective in 
this regard, as NHRI policy priorities and ultimate decisions will be made at a central level, even 
if local office hires reflect the cultural make-up of the community.
57
  
C. Administrative Autonomy 
 Perhaps the strongest argument for the establishment of SNHRIs (rather than the mere 
deconcentration of NHRIs) is that SNHRIs are the best (or perhaps the only) way to influence 
local government policy in jurisdictions that have a significant level of administrative or 
legislative autonomy. This argument has been made at times by the Council of Regions and other 
actors with an interest in preserving sub-national political authority.
58
 The argument progresses 
as follows. First, advocates for decentralisation will point out that local authorities are intimately 
involved in human rights protection and implementation, and in particular are generally heavily 
involved in developing and implementing policies that can impact social and economic rights, 
such as public health, housing, social welfare, education, employment, urban planning and 
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environmental protection.
59
 However, there is sometimes insufficient attention paid to local 
government’s impact on human rights, due to a systematic bias among human rights advocates 
and scholars to monitor developments at the national or supra-national level.
60
 Therefore, given 
the relevance of local government activities to human rights, and the relative lack of supervision, 
it is desirable for an HRI of some sort to monitor local government activities and provide 
appropriate recommendations when its laws or policies have violated or threaten to violate 
human rights. In countries where there is no NHRI, this means that an SNHRI should be 
established to fill the gap. Where there is an NHRI, the establishment of an SNHRI might still be 
necessary, because the NHRI might be legally prohibited from interfering with the actions of 
regional and municipal authorities when administration is divided into federal, autonomous, or 
highly decentralised jurisdictions.
61
 Even where it would be legally permissible for a national-
level body to pass judgment on the work of a lower-level autonomous governmental entity, it is 
worth bearing in mind that NHRI opinions are (in general) non-binding, and therefore only 
effective in as much as their addressee takes them into consideration and follows their 
recommendations.
62
 If an autonomous entity would be systematically less likely to follow 
recommendations from a NHRI than from a local SNHRI due to autonomy concerns, then an 
SNHRI would end up as the more effective body for influencing local authorities. 
 The argument in favor of SNHRI establishment due to sub-national autonomy concerns is 
strong. There are a few other considerations, however. First, in many countries, lower 
administrative divisions are commonly subject to national oversight, and therefore autonomy 
concerns would be relatively muted.
63
 Second, this argument is only valid to the extent that 
NHRIs focus their attention on influencing sub-national governments. Thus, for ombudsman-
type institutions that are generally focused on offering citizens a venue for appealing government 
human rights (and other) abuses, the establishment of SNHRIs may offer the optimal solution, as 
has been noted by Council of Europe experts.
64
 However, if a Commission-type NHRI is more 
interested in human rights promotion, research, training and the like (such as, arguably, the 
German Institute for Human Rights), then even strongly federal or autonomous administrative 
structures present little barrier to operation throughout the country.  
                                                          
59
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Third, the appropriateness of SNHRI establishment in an autonomous or decentralised 
region will to some extent depend on the nature of the SNHRI’s mandate, and specifically the 
sources of law which it draws from. Where SNHRIs implement human rights norms that have 
been either developed at the national level (in the form of constitutions or legislation) or 
accepted at the national level (by treaty ratification), then the SNHRIs are to some extent being 
delegated administrative authority, or the ‘right to act’ (in Braun and Keman’s terminology), 
rather than political authority, or the ‘right to decide’.65 In fact, the sub-national entity’s ‘right to 
decide’ in other policy areas may be limited by SNHRI pressure to comply with rights norms that 
were developed or accepted at the national level, leading to a de facto reduction in relative 
decision-making powers at the sub-national level. Of course, this de facto reduction in autonomy 
may be considered an advantage or a disadvantage, depending on the situation, and one’s 
perspective. 
Fourth, the establishment of an SNHRI in an autonomous region may serve as a symbolic 
indication of ‘national’ legitimacy, especially where it acts like an NHRI, for example by 
participating in UN mechanisms. The Scottish National Human Rights Commission, Somaliland 
National Human Rights Commission, and Kurdistan Human Rights Commission (none of which 
are based in recognized ‘nations’ in the international law sense) are good examples of this 
dynamic. Evidently, observers will differ as to whether these elements of symbolic nationhood 
are normatively desirable or not, but it is an element that should be considered in some cases. 
D. Human rights innovation 
 One classic argument in favor of decentralisation is that it promotes innovation at the 
sub-national level, as sub-national actors face an incentive to adopt best practices and invest in 
policy innovation in the face of mobile citizens who have an ability to choose which jurisdiction 
to live and work in.
66
 A corollary of this argument that is often cited in the US is Judge Brandeis’ 
famous claim that states are ‘laboratories of democracy’ that can experiment with policies that, if 
successful, can then be adopted in other states or even at the national level.
67
 These innovations 
also come with decreased risk, as failure would be limited to a relatively small area rather than 
the entire nation.
68
 The innovation argument is also a product of sub-national heterogeneity, as 
discussed in the previous section, however in this case it is dependent not on cultural or ethnic 
differences, but rather in a variability in willingness to accept human rights norms and structures. 
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 In the realm of human rights implementation, proponents of decentralisation have 
highlighted the importance of states and localities as laboratories for rights innovation.
69
 
According to Chaney, ‘international literature suggests that regional governance may foster 
policy divergence and instances of innovation in equality and human rights practice’.70 In some 
cases, especially in ‘human rights cities’, much of this innovation has been structural or 
procedural in nature, involving the establishment of new committees, requirements of human 
rights budgeting or assessment, or public consultation processes.
71
 Elsewhere, sub-national 
entities, including SNHRIs, have engaged in more substantive human rights innovation, by 
embracing and, at times, attempting to operationalize rights norms that were not yet accepted at 
the national level. In perhaps the best-known example of this phenomenon, dozens of US cities 
have passed resolutions in support of the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (‘CEDAW’) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
despite the US not being a party to either treaty, with San Francisco, Berkeley and Los Angeles 
going a step further to actually enact CEDAW principles into law.
72
 At times, SNHRIs have 
encouraged such policies.
73
 Another example has been the gradual sub-national embrace of 
LGBT rights in recent decades.
74
 While national jurisdictions and supra-national bodies have in 
many cases been slow in embracing LGBT rights protections, some SNHRIs have been speaking 
out on the issue for many years, even in areas that are not normally thought of as socially 
progressive, such as Michigan or the Basque Country.
75
 
There are different potential reasons why SNHRIs may desire to go beyond what an 
NHRI might undertake in the field of rights. In part, they may represent particularly progressive 
polities with broader conceptions of human rights. They may also be involved in ‘branding’ their 
jurisdictions as human rights-friendly, as a way of standing out from their peers or in order to 
attract new inhabitants. They may simply be more nimble and creative because they are smaller 
or less bound by detailed legislative mandates or oversight. From a human rights perspective, a 
stronger sub-national human rights commitment has been lauded as a way not only to improve 
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conditions at the local level, but potentially also to place pressure on national governments or 
sub-national peers to improve their rights practices.
76
 
 There are a few qualifications to this argument, however. Some would argue that human 
rights protections should be equal for every person throughout a country; this claim will be 
discussed in detail below. Second, it is in theory possible that the opposite dynamic could also 
occur, and SNHRIs could choose to interpret human rights norms more restrictively than they are 
interpreted by NHRIs.
77
 Third, the development of stronger human rights norms at the sub-
national level is of course not dependent on the establishment of an SNHRI. Many sub-national 
entities have legislatively embraced rights norms that go beyond those at the national level, 
obvious examples being the constitutional rights enacted by US states and Canadian provinces, 
or the municipal human rights laws or human rights declarations passed by cities and town 
councils around the world. However, while SNHRIs are not the only venue for normative 
development, they do provide certain advantages in that respect. Namely, SNHRIs are normally 
composed of human rights experts, are able to progressively develop norms through continuous 
attention to an issue (rather than the necessarily episodic law-making process), and are arguably 
able to go farther in their advocacy of rights norms because their independence acts as a shield 
from political backlash. 
E. Robustness 
 A final general argument in favor of decentralisation is that it is a way of providing 
robustness and resiliency in national and sub-national service provision.
78
 In the current context, 
this means that the establishment of SNHRIs can provide for greater robustness in human rights 
service delivery, in particular by introducing a hedge against situations where the local 
population lacks sufficient human rights protection because the NHRI is ineffective or lacks 
independence. As Ghai notes, ‘if government at one level is not supportive of rights, citizens can 
go to the other level for protection.’79  
 In fact, there are a number of situations where the establishment of a SNHRI has been 
justified (before or after the fact) with reference to the deficiencies of a relevant NHRI. I have 
elsewhere demonstrated how the establishment of Korean SNHRIs coincides with (and arguably 
results from) a period of decreased independence at Korea’s National Human Rights 
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Commission.
80
 In Indonesia, the Yogyakarta Ombudsman’s effectiveness has been contrasted 
with the declining effectiveness of that country’s national ombudsman.81 In a somewhat different 
context, Carver too noted that an argument in favor of multiple issue-specific human rights 
institutions in the UK was that ‘poor leadership of a single institution can have deleterious 
consequences on the human rights protection system as whole’.82 
A similar argument can be made in favor of establishing SNHRIs in jurisdictions where 
NHRIs do not hear complaints, in which case sub-national outlets may be the only non-judicial 
recourse. Even when NHRIs do hear complaints, they may be slow, ineffective or overly 
conservative in their rulings. SNHRIs can in these cases provide access to a better quality of 
justice. For example, a comparison of fair housing complaints handled by the US federal 
government with complaints handled by state and local human rights commissions found that 
southern commissions were more likely to provide an outcome favorable to the complainant, 
thus providing a justification for SNHRI complaint-handling (and perhaps countering 
expectations concerning local reluctance to enforce anti-discrimination laws in the southern 
US).
83
 
IV. Arguments against the Establishment of SNHRIs 
 Next, I will outline five principal arguments against the establishment of SNHRIs in 
countries that already possess NHRIs, based on general arguments against decentralisation. As is 
the case with the arguments in favor, these arguments will be more or less convincing depending 
on the circumstances in a particular jurisdiction, the normative preferences of the decision maker, 
the type of SNHRI in question, and many other factors. 
A. Redundancy  
Oftentimes, the first argument against decentralisation leading to shared jurisdiction over 
the same tasks is that the ensuing redundancy would be wasteful and overly complex in practice.  
As Warner noted almost a century ago, ‘the existence of two independent systems of 
governmental activity causes expensive duplication and endless conflicts.’84 This argument may 
apply to the establishment of SNHRIs in countries that already possess NHRIs, because an 
SNHRI’s functions are, at least in large part, often already carried out by an existing NHRI.85 
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Furthermore, proponents of this argument would claim that the redundant nature of SNHRIs 
where NHRIs already exist has real costs. Creating SNHRIs could take away (often local) 
funding that could be better used on education, parks, or other social programs. SNHRIs could 
draw public attention away from an NHRI that may already be struggling to closely engage with 
local populations. The existence of SNHRIs and an NHRI could also cause confusion in the 
complaint-handling process, as victims of human rights abuses will be uncertain which venue to 
approach, and other societal actors will be unsure of how to act in the event of divergence 
between an NHRI and SNHRI.
86
  
 There are a few possible replies to this argument. First, in some cases (as noted above), 
there will be little if any overlap or redundancy between SNHRIs or NHRIs, as the NHRI will be 
prevented from intervening with sub-national governments due to autonomy concerns.
87
 Where 
overlapping mandates do exist, they can be managed through coordination, as already occurs in 
several countries. This can involve regular meetings between the NHRI and SNHRIs, as occurs 
in Russia, India and Mexico; an annual conference including NHRI and SNHRIS as occurs in 
Spain; NHRI and SNHRI membership in a common networking association, as in Australia, 
Canada and Argentina, formal MOUs between an NHRI and SNHRIs, as occurs in Spain and 
Mexico, or informal consultations, as occurs in Korea.
88
  
Second, there are also scholars who view redundancy as a desirable feature of 
decentralisation.
89
 It can promote reliability, because (as discussed above with respect to 
inefficient or non-independent NHRIs) if one part of government fails, another can step in to 
provide services.
90
 Martin Landau asserts that ‘redundancy serves many vital functions ... it 
provides safety factors, permits flexible responses to anomalous situations and provides a 
creative potential’.91 At least in the US context, there is empirical evidence that the existence of a 
sub-national human rights complaint procedure alongside a national one has a beneficial effect 
from an access to justice perspective, by increasing the total number of human rights complaints 
as compared with a solely national complaint system, even when the legal mandate is identical at 
both levels. In a 2008 analysis of anti-discrimination complaints in Kentucky, researchers 
compared the number of housing discrimination complaints filed in counties that had human 
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rights commissions (and thus, the option of filing complaints either at the local or federal level) 
with the number of complaints in counties that lacked local human rights commissions (and thus 
could only file such complaints at the federal level).
92
 The study found that counties with local 
human rights commissions saw a significant increase in the number of disability discrimination 
complaints filed, with the odds of complainant success being identical at the local and federal 
levels. A similar study in North Carolina found that the presence of local commissions 
significantly increases the total number of rental housing complaints.
93
  
Finally, it should be noted that the strength of the redundancy argument will depend to a 
certain extent on the level of NHRI deconcentration. If an NHRI is highly centralized, it may 
have relatively few promotional, monitoring and protective activities in localities far from the 
capital, and there would thus be relatively little overlap with the activities of local SNHRIs.  
B. Economies of scale 
 One common argument in favor of administrative centralization is that it is cheaper due 
to the benefits of economies of scale. According to proponents of this argument, central service 
delivery is normally more efficient due to savings arising from reduced bureaucratic spending on 
policy design and implementation, as well as overhead, bulk purchasing, and other types of cost 
savings.
94
 This general argument has also been made with respect to SNHRIs in particular. 
According to Bartlett, ‘A single institution can be, at least in theory, cheaper for the public 
budget than ten of them, with their corresponding ombudsmen and deputies’.95 While arguing for 
one NHRI instead of several focused on different rights issues, Carver claims that ‘a single 
human rights institution is able to make economies that allow it to be considerably more cost-
effective than multiple institutions’, in part because ‘the overwhelming majority of the budget of 
these institutions thus goes on staff costs and office and information technology infrastructure, 
and only a very small proportion on projects or programme activity’.96 
 The main rebuttal to this argument is that as an empirical matter, it is unclear whether 
economies of scale can really result from any given centralization experience; some doubt 
whether this is normally the case. As Prud’homme notes, ‘the prevailing view is that there are 
few local public services for which economies of scale imply nationwide supply’.97 There are 
other countervailing considerations that might make SNHRIs more affordable, such as NHRIs’ 
‘elongated chains of command/supervision, [and] remoteness from the scene of action’. 98 
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Among other factors, the precise activities undertaken by a particular SNHRI and NHRI will 
impact whether economies of scale potentially apply. While human rights research, the 
development of human rights training modules, and engagement with international mechanisms 
(among other tasks) may be more affordable when conducted by a single large NHRI rather than 
many small SNHRIs, human rights monitoring and complaint investigation necessarily involve 
significant periods on the ground in local areas (when done well), and, for these functions, the 
costs of travel back and forth from a distant capital may outweigh any savings from economies 
of scale.  
C. Administrative Ineffectiveness 
 A third general argument against decentralisation is that sub-national administration tends 
to be less effective than administration at the national level due to inferior human, financial or 
technical resources at the sub-national level.
99
  According to this line of thought, SNHRIs are 
likely to be systematically less effective than NHRIs (or NHRI branch offices). There are 
different elements of this claim. One problem could be that SNHRIs may be unable to attract 
employees with human rights education or expertise, especially in small or poorer jurisdictions. 
Staffing challenges has been generally claimed as a potential downside of decentralisation by 
some scholars, both because lower tiers of government may pay relatively lower salaries, but 
also because national governments may offer more desirable careers, with ‘greater diversity of 
tasks, more possibilities of promotion, less political intervention, and a longer view of issues.’100  
In the human rights field, SNHRI staffing concerns may be even more pronounced, in part 
because many SNHRIs operate on shoestring budgets or with volunteer personnel, and in part 
because human rights law often requires an advanced education and is studied by relatively few 
people in some regions. As an empirical matter, adequate staffing has been noted as a problem 
for SNHRIs in India and Serbia.
101
  
Another issue could be that a lack of sufficient funding at the sub-national level could 
harm the effective administrative functioning of an SNHRI.
102
 This has arguably been the case in 
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locations as disparate as India and Michigan.
103
 Lack of resources has also been used to argue 
against the establishment of local ombudsmen in Jamaica, where there is an ombudsman 
institution at the national level.
104
 Of course, this issue could be overcome if sufficient funding is 
provided by national-level sources to sustain adequate offices, and may not be a major issue in 
relatively wealthy jurisdictions. 
Finally, one common argument against decentralisation holds that local levels of 
government may be less effective because they are more likely to be corrupt
105
 or come under the 
control of local private interests.
106
 An analogous argument has also been made regarding 
SNHRIs; namely, that they are more susceptible to pressure from local elites, and therefore are 
less likely than national-level institutions to be fully independent.
107
 There are, however, many 
opponents to the general claim of greater corruption and co-option by local elites.
108
 Empirical 
research on the issue (as is so often the case in the decentralisation debate) is inconclusive.
109
   
Presumably, outright corruption would be somewhat less of an issue with SNHRIs than with 
many other government offices, though, because SNHRIs would not normally be in charge of the 
distribution of expensive goods and services.  
D. Spillover effects 
Another well-known risk of decentralisation is that sub-national decision-making could 
lead to spillovers, or negative effects outside of a particular jurisdiction, because sub-national 
officials (unlike national officials) will not have an incentive to take into account the desires of 
the rest of the country.
110
 Spillovers are common in some issue areas, and far less common in 
others. In general, human rights implementation is likely to be an area with relatively few 
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negative spillover effects, but there are (arguably) still some issues that could arise, which could 
be used as arguments against SNHRI establishment.  
For example, an SNHRI in a largely indigenous area could press for greater indigenous 
rights to control or use certain territories or goods. This would inevitably imply a reduction in 
power for external actors over such territory or goods. Or, to give another example, an 
autonomous region could argue that the right to self-determination implies greater local control 
over resources (or even secession), either of which would inevitably have significant effects on 
the rest of the country, effects that many would consider negative. Perhaps most controversially, 
an SNHRI could provide greater rights for undocumented immigrants, leading to (some would 
argue) the spillover effect of weakening a nationwide policy of deporting undocumented workers, 
and acting as a pull factor for irregular immigration.
111
 
Of course, in most circumstances, none of these spillover effects would be seen as 
particularly likely to occur, and at any rate SNHRIs might have limited influence to affect the 
debate with such high-profile political issues. In contrast, positive spillover effects would 
arguably be more likely to stem from SNHRI’s work to implement greater human rights 
protections. Free speech in one jurisdiction can be enjoyed across the country; due process rights 
are enjoyed by defendants regardless of their origin, and affordable tertiary educational 
opportunities are not usually restricted to the residents of a sub-national jurisdiction, to give just 
three examples of human rights issues with beneficial extra-jurisdictional effects.  
E. Fragmentation 
One of the classic arguments against decentralisation is that it can lead to greater 
inequalities or disparities among sub-national units.
112
 As Besley and Ghatak state, ‘there is 
clearly a tension between pursuing goals of equality in service provision and greater 
decentralisation and choice’.113 In general, the focus of criticism in this regard has been that 
wealthier (or more administratively capable) sub-national jurisdictions will deliver a given 
service better than their peers, as for example with locally run schools.
114
 Disparities in the 
quality of human rights service delivery may be an issue for SNHRIs, at least to the extent that it 
contributes to other disparate outcomes; as Oomen notes, ‘a movement in which some cities 
become human rights cities and others do not runs the risk of contributing to inequality between 
cities’. 115  However, there are two somewhat different aspects of fragmented human rights 
implementation that are more relevant for the decision on whether to establish SNHRIs.  
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First, there is the desire to avoid individuals within a single nation enjoying different 
types of human rights implementation. There is already evidence of distinctive sub-national 
human rights development in the context of UK devolution.
116
 While differences in the nature (as 
opposed to the quality) of services delivered may be of little concern (or even desirable) in 
certain issue areas, some would argue that human rights are different, and that it is important that 
all persons within a country enjoy the same human rights, in order to ensure that all citizens are 
treated as equals. In the Australian context, for example, one argument has been that ‘within a 
federation, the principle of equality between polities and the importance of consent suggest that 
matters such as rights protection, which lie at the heart of arrangements for the governance of the 
federation, ought to be dealt with on a national uniform standard’. 117 Carver has also argued that 
the existence of a consistent standard for all individuals is a reason to favor the establishment of 
one NHRI instead of multiple issue-specific human rights institutions.
118
  
Second, there is the broader concern that the proliferation of rights interpreting 
institutions implied by the establishment of SNHRIs could increase the fragmentation of an 
international human rights regime that depends on its universalism for it normative power. 
According to this argument, as the number of authoritative interpreters of human rights increases, 
the chances of divergences and even contradictions among them will naturally increase, as well, 
to the point that it will be difficult to say there is one corpus of international human rights law 
that apply to all humans.
119
 This is arguably an even greater risk with regards to sub-national 
actors, who may tend to have more particularistic perspectives on some rights issues, or engage 
in localization. As Parrish states, a ‘universalistic outlook is in tension with the idea of states as 
laboratories, each developing its own novel version of human rights’, and the greater the number 
of sub-national actors interpreting human rights, the greater the fragmentation of human rights 
law.
120
  
Each of these arguments would be heavily contested, however, for a variety of reasons. In 
the domestic context, many would deny that human rights protection need be the same 
everywhere in a given country. Every nation’s political culture is different with regard to what is 
considered fundamental to citizenship, and in many autonomous or semi-autonomous 
jurisdictions, different rights are seen as important to a particular sub-national identity.
121
 At the 
global level, some legal pluralists would deny the existence of a universal body of human rights 
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norms.
122
 Others would accept that universal standards exists but deny that local interpretations 
pose a threat, arguing instead that universal norms allow for some variation in content so as to 
make those norms locally relevant,
123
 or that it is possible to establish a compatibility between 
different interpretations due to the existence of networks or interpretative structures.
124
 Others 
might even accept that fragmentation due to a proliferation of authoritative institutions is a threat 
to universal norms, but deny that SNHRIs are likely to be authoritative enough to make a real 
difference, given that their judgments are normally non-binding, and their jurisprudence is (with 
a few possible exceptions) usually little-noted, even within a given jurisdiction.  
It is also worth noting that to the extent that one considers fragmentation to be a real 
danger, either at the domestic or international levels, there are ways that SNHRIs can be 
established so as to minimize the risk. For example, there can be appeals permitted of SNHRI 
decisions, either in the ordinary court system or to a particular NHRI. This would provide at least 
one mechanism for ensuring a level of conformity within a given nation. In addition, the degree 
to which fragmentation would be an issue may depend somewhat on the SNHRI’s normative 
mandate; a mandate that specifies the implementation of certain treaties or national constitutional 
rights would presumably lead to somewhat fewer jurisprudential divergences from international 
or national norms than a mandate that simply directed an SNHRI to implement ‘human rights’ 
without further guidance. Lastly, an SNHRI that focuses on human rights promotion or 
monitoring rather than complaint-handling may have fewer opportunities to issue authoritative 
opinions on issues of human rights interpretation. 
V. Conclusion 
 Based on the arguments outlined above, it would of course be impossible to make a 
general conclusion that the establishment of an SNHRI is always desirable or never desirable in a 
jurisdiction that already contain an NHRI. One can, however, come to certain conclusions about 
the circumstances under which SNHRIs would be more desirable, and, presumably, more likely 
to be established, as follows. 
First, where the NHRI in a given country is presently weak or ineffective, then the 
robustness argument in favor of NHRIs becomes much stronger, as the human rights system in a 
given country is evidently not functioning appropriately. Conversely, the arguments that an 
SNHRI would be redundant or less effective than the NHRI would be less convincing if an 
NHRI has already demonstrated that it is not doing its job effectively.  
Second, in federal countries, or autonomous regions where there is an NHRI that lacks 
legal authority to engage with sub-national governments, then the establishment of SNHRIs 
would also seem more appropriate. In fact, as I have elsewhere described, this seems borne out 
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empirically, as nine out of sixteen federal nations with NHRIs also have established SNHRIs at 
the highest sub-national level.
125
 To a certain extent, however, this conclusion depends on the 
justifications for a federal system in a given country; in nations such as Austria and Germany 
that utilize federalism primarily as a means of promoting administrative efficiency (rather than as 
a way to encourage locally appropriate responses to a heterogeneous population), then the 
autonomy-based argument for SNHRIs may be somewhat weaker.
126
  
Third, in countries that are particularly large or lack rapid transportation links with the 
capital, the physical proximity argument in favor of the establishment of SNHRIs becomes more 
convincing (with the caveat that this argument applies to deconcentration as well). 
Fourth, the establishment of SNHRIs is more likely to be appropriate in large or 
prosperous sub-national jurisdictions, because SNHRIs in such jurisdictions are more likely to be 
large enough that they will be able to themselves take advantage of certain economies of scale, 
and they will be less likely to suffer from administrative ineffectiveness due to financial or 
technical deficiencies. 
Fifth, in heterogeneous countries with locally distinct communities, the establishment of 
SNHRIs will make sense if one values the benefits of local innovation and cultural affinity more 
than the dangers of negative spillover and fragmentation. This will normally be the case where 
the initiative to establish the SNHRI starts at the sub-national level, as spillover and 
fragmentation (by their nature) are largely externalized costs, while innovation and localization 
are benefits enjoyed by the sub-national entity itself. 
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